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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between liquidity and quality of financial 
information by analyzing long-term trends in Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure for 
firms that restate financial statements. I find that for most income decreasing restatements 
illiquidity increases several months before restatement announcement and remains at 
elevated levels one year after restatement. The result is most pronounced for firms listed 
on NASDAQ. Increase in illiquidity is greater upon restatements due to revenue 
recognition, those prompted by party other than auditor, those made by larger firms with 
high volatility of returns and low price levels. Income increasing restatements do not 
affect information asymmetry of the firm. Overall, my results indicate a positive 
relationship between quality of financial information and liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the corporate scandals of the Enron era and the recent financial 
crisis, policy makers and regulators have called for improved quality of financial 
reporting and greater transparency. However, the evidence regarding the costs and 
benefits of financial reporting and disclosure remains limited (Leuz and Wysocki 
(2008)).1 The benefit of disclosure best supported by theory is the increase in liquidity of 
a firm’s shares (Verrecchia (2001)). Liquidity is negatively related to the level of adverse 
selection in the market, which results from some traders having informational advantage 
over other traders (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985)). If better quality financial 
information reduces the level of adverse selection in the market, then liquidity will 
increase. 
Empirical literature on the relation between the quality of financial information 
and liquidity is limited (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)). Several papers examine the 
association between liquidity and analyst evaluations of disclosure quality (Welker 
(1995), Healy, et al. (1999) and Heflin, et al. (2002)).2 They find that better disclosure 
increases liquidity. For example, Welker (1995) documents that firms in the lowest third 
of the disclosure rankings have a 50% higher bid-ask spread. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
use an event study framework and show that German firms that commit to higher levels 
of disclosure by switching to International Accounting Standards (IAS) or U.S. GAAP 
experience a 35% decrease in bid-ask spread and a 50% increase in share turnover.  
                                                 
1
 The terms “disclosure”, “transparency” and “quality of information” are used interchangeably.  
2
 These papers use CFA Institute (formerly Association for Investment and Management Research 
(AIMR)) score to measure quality of firm’s disclosure. The score is composed by financial analysts and 
evaluates firm disclosure based on annual published information, quarterly and other published 
information, and communications with analysts. 
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Ng (2008) examines other measures of information quality and finds that 
management forecast frequency is negatively associated with a firm’s liquidity, while 
relevance of earnings and accrual quality are not significantly associated with a firm’s 
liquidity. Jayaraman (2008) finds that the bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed 
trading are higher when public information is less informative, e.g. when the difference 
between the volatility of earnings and the volatility of cash flows is high. This relation 
holds both when earnings are smoother than cash flows and when earnings are more 
volatile than cash flows. Bhattacharya, Desai and Venkataraman (2010) find that accrual 
quality is positively associated with high frequency measure of the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread, and that firms with poor earnings quality experience a 
greater increase in information asymmetry around earnings announcements. Ascioglu, 
Hegde and McDermott (2005) find that auditor compensation, which has been found to 
be associated with disclosure quality, decreases liquidity for firms with weak corporate 
governance.  
This paper extends the literature on the relation between liquidity and quality of 
financial information by examining long-term trends in liquidity for firms that make 
material mistakes in financial statements requiring a restatement. My research design has 
several advantages. As pointed out by Leuz and Wysocki (2008) “the existing literature 
shows that measuring firms’ financial reporting and disclosure activities is difficult and 
that commonly used proxies exhibit many problems.” Instead of using a proxy for the 
quality of financial information, for restating firms one observes the period during which 
financial statements of a firm were of poor quality and knows the date when the market 
learns for the first time of the reporting issues. Second, a restating firm can be used as its 
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own control, therefore eliminating the need to account for potential endogeneity of the 
firm’s quality of financial information and liquidity.  
I estimate Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity for restating firms over three 
periods: 1) a one-year period prior to the 1st restated report (pre-error period); 2) the error 
period, which extends from the first misstated period to the date of restatement 
announcement; and 3) a three-year period after the restatement announcement (post-
restatement period). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to study changes 
in liquidity around restatement during these periods. 
There are several reasons why examination of long-term liquidity around 
restatement announcement is important. First, studies of short-term changes in 
information asymmetry provide mixed results.  Anderson and Yohn (2002) find that bid-
ask spread increases surrounding restatements of revenue accounts. However, Palmrose, 
Richardson and Scholz (2004) do not confirm this result. Second, in its report to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Advisory Committee on Improvements 
to Financial Reporting (CIFR) expressed concern regarding the time it takes for restating 
firms to disclose full impact of a restatement.3 For many firms the time between 
restatement announcement and the filing of restated financial statements can take as long 
as one year. According to CIFR, during this period the firms report little financial 
information. CIFR claims that “[l]imited information seriously undermines the quality of 
investor analysis” (CIFR 2008, 79). Examination of long-term changes in liquidity after 
restatement announcement will provide evidence regarding CIFR’s concern. It will also 
provide empirical analysis of the belief of analysts and regulators that restatements cause 
long-term damage to credibility of firm’s financial information (Wilson (2008)). Third, 
                                                 
3
 See Badertscher and Burks (2010) for detailed discussion of this issue.  
 5 
restatements received considerable attention from law makers and affected such 
influential regulations as Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz 
(2004)), making it important to know the full impact of a restatement, which is unlikely 
to be limited to the short-term window around its announcement.  
Using Fama McBeth (1973) type regression that corrects for cross-sectional 
correlation of residuals, I find that firms restating net income downward (income 
decreasing restatements) that are listed on NASDAQ experience an increase in illiquidity 
four months before restatement announcement that continues one year after restatement. 
For income decreasing restating firms listed on NYSE or AMEX illiquidity increases one 
month after restatement and remains at elevated levels 12 months after restatement. An 
increase in illiquidity around restatement announcement for income decreasing 
restatements is economically important. For NASDAQ (NYSE/AMEX) firms, illiquidity 
three months before restatement increases 39% (55%), at restatement announcement – 
43% (42%) and one year after restatement – 129% (80%) relative to pre-restatement 
level. I find no changes in illiquidity for firms that restate net income upward (income 
increasing restatements). 
To summarize, this paper finds a substantial increase in information asymmetry in 
anticipation of income decreasing restatement announcement for firms listed on 
NASDAQ. For income decreasing restating firms listed on all exchanges information 
asymmetry increases after restatement and remains at elevated levels for at least one year. 
Income increasing restatements do not affect information asymmetry of the firm. Overall, 
my results indicate a positive relation between quality of financial information and 
liquidity, supporting regulations that aim at improving the quality of financial 
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information. This analysis is particularly timely given the focus of regulators on 
restatements and their concern that a firm’s information environment is adversely 
affected by a restatement (Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting, 
2008). 
Cross-sectional analysis of the changes in illiquidity for income decreasing 
NASDAQ restatements reveals that restatements originated by an auditor result in lower 
changes in illiquidity both before and after a restatement.4 Income decreasing NASDAQ 
restatements experience greater increase in illiquidity prior to restatement. Restatements 
that affect revenue recognition increase illiquidity more following restatement 
announcement for firms listed on all exchanges. Larger firms with higher volatility of 
returns have greater increase in illiquidity, while stocks with higher price experience 
smaller increase in illiquidity.  
The paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, it extends prior 
research on the implications of the quality of financial information on liquidity.  
However, I use an event study framework to establish poor quality of financial 
information as opposed to an imperfect proxy for information quality. Second, the paper 
contributes to the literature on restatements. Restatements have increased in the past 
decade, motivating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and several SEC initiatives, which in 
turn lowered the threshold for errors that required restatements. The full impact of a 
restatement can be better understood by considering its liquidity effect. This paper is the 
first to document that income decreasing restatements increase information asymmetry 
several months before and one year after restatement announcement; and that income 
increasing restatements do not affect information asymmetry. This paper is also the first 
                                                 
4
 I use GAO (2002) for identification of the prompter of the restatement.  
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to document cross-sectional differences in the changes of liquidity around restatement 
announcement. My analysis complements that of Palmrose, Richardson and Sholz 
(2004), Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Badertscher and Burks (2010) by focusing on 
much longer windows both before and after restatement, documenting trends in liquidity 
for different types of restatements and performing cross-sectional analysis of changes in 
liquidity.5  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines hypotheses and 
reviews related literature. My measure of liquidity is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the data and sample selection. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses and literature review 
Firms that restate financial statements experience large shareholder losses at 
restatement announcement (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), Akhigbe, Kudla, 
and Madura (2005)). Large negative reaction to restatements is caused by the revelation 
that financial information of restating firms is worse than previously believed by the 
market. Poor quality of financial information can create information asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers of firm shares, which would result in reduced levels of liquidity of firm 
shares. This happens because market makers widen the bid-ask spread in order to protect 
themselves from better informed traders and to be compensated for bearing greater risk 
(Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Amihud and Mendelson (1988), Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000), Kyle (1985), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).  
                                                 
5
 Please see the next section for detailed literature review. 
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Several papers have examined changes in liquidity around restatement 
announcements. Anderson and Yohn (2002) study the change in bid-ask spreads during 
three days before announcement of the problem through three days after restatement 
filing and find that spreads increase for revenue recognition restatements. Controlling for 
other factors, they find that information asymmetry decreases upon restatement of 
restructuring items and increases upon revenue recognition restatements. However, 
Palmrose, Richardson and Sholz (2004) are unable to replicate these results, finding no 
changes in bid-ask spreads around restatement announcement. They do find that 
dispersion of analyst expectations increases substantially at restatement announcement, 
suggesting increased uncertainty. Using a sample of Canadian restatements, Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (2010) find that relative quoted and effective spreads increase at restatement 
announcement and remain higher 46 trading days after restatement. They also find that 
relative (not absolute) spreads and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity estimates increase for 
revenue recognition restatements. 
Badertscher and Burks (2010) analyze changes in liquidity 90 days prior to 
restatement, the period between restatement announcement and disclosure of the full 
impact of restatement (the disclosure period), and 90 days after disclosure. They find no 
difference in liquidity in these three periods for the full sample and find that fraudulent 
restatements result in lower liquidity during the disclosure period. In their sample, the 
disclosure period has a median of zero days for the full sample and 20 days for fraudulent 
restatements, which is a much shorter window than the one analyzed in this study. The 
focus of this paper is to analyze long-term changes in liquidity for all restatements.  
 9 
Prior literature finds that some traders, such as short-sellers, large and institutional 
investors and insiders, are better informed about the quality of financial reports during the 
error period and are better able to detect poor earnings quality. For example, Desai, 
Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman (2006) show that short seller interest in the 
restatement firms increases steadily prior to restatement announcement starting as early 
as 24 months before restatement. They also show that short-sellers close their positions 
after restatement announcement as the stock price declines.6 Frieder and Shanthikumar 
(2007) show that large traders sell and small traders buy restating firms one month prior 
to restatement announcement. Hribar, Jenkings and Wang (2005) find that institutional 
investors with shorter investment horizons and higher portfolio turnover significantly 
reduce their holdings in a restating firm at least one quarter prior to the quarter of the 
restatement.7 Top management sells substantially more stock during the error period of 
restating firms that revise earnings downward, correct more than four quarters, 
experience larger negative reaction at restatement announcement and result in greater 
dollar losses to insiders upon the announcement.  
These studies’ results are consistent with the notion that sophisticated investors 
are better able to see through financial statement errors and that their ability to detect 
poor earnings quality becomes greater as restatement date approaches. This may lead to a 
decrease in liquidity in the error period, which is defined as the period during which 
reported earnings and other financial information contains material errors (see Figure 1). 
This leads to the first hypothesis tested in this paper. 
 
                                                 
6
 Efendi, Kinney and Swanson (2004) find similar evidence regarding short-sellers.  
7
 See also Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2006). 
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Hypothesis 1: Liquidity of restating firms decreases in the error period. The decrease 
intensifies as the restatement date approaches.  
 
 
 
 
 
 1: Restatement Timeline 
Figure 1: Restatement Timeline 
 
If as a result of sophisticated investors detecting poor earnings quality of restating 
firms information asymmetry of restating firms increases prior to restatement 
announcement, the announcement of a restatement can reduce information asymmetry 
and equalize information sets of different types of investors. At the same time, the 
restatement announcement provides incentives for investors to obtain private information 
regarding consequences of a restatement. Moreover, a disclosure of material errors in 
financial statements can create uncertainty about the quality of future financial 
information released by the firm. Indeed, Wilson (2008) analyzes earnings response 
coefficients for earnings announcements surrounding restatements and finds that the 
information content of earnings declines following a restatement.  
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) find that many restating firms delist 
following a restatement. Bardos, Golec and Harding (2010a) show that surviving firms 
experience negative abnormal returns following a restatement. This suggests that analyst 
            Pre-error period                                     Error period                                  Post-restatement period 
Beginning of the  
1st misstated period 
Restatement 
announcement 
Announcements of 10-Qs 
and 10-Ks containing 
material mistakes 
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following and institutional ownership will decline after restatement, which will increase 
the risk of a market maker facing order imbalance during liquidity shocks for stocks with 
low investor interest. As a result, a market maker will widen spreads and liquidity will 
decrease.  
Furthermore, restatements can cast doubt on the competency of management and 
firms’ future performance. Consistent with this contention, many restating firms 
experience turnover of top level management (Desai et al. (2006), Srinivasan (2005), 
Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2007)). Restatement also increases the likelihood of litigation 
(Bardos, Golec and Harding (2010b)) and adversely affects the cost of equity and loan 
contracting (Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), Bardos and Mishra (2010)). The adverse 
consequences of restatements can worsen information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors. Whether or not the decrease in liquidity after restatement is 
temporary is an empirical question. If investors regain confidence in restating firms with 
time, the decrease in liquidity will be temporary, which would be consistent with 
Wilson’s (2008) finding that the decline in information content of earnings response 
coefficient is temporary.  I expect that liquidity decreases in post-restatement period; this 
leads to my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Liquidity of restating firms decreases in post-restatement period. 
 
3. Measure of illiquidity 
To test the hypotheses, I analyze the liquidity of restating firms in pre-error, error 
and post-restatement periods. The level of liquidity in the pre-error period, during which 
financial statements did not contain material errors, serves as a baseline. Market 
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microstructure literature offers several definitions of liquidity. Most prominent is Kyle's 
(1985) lambda, measuring the impact of order flow on price.  Other measures include 
quoted bid-ask spread of stock returns (Amihud and Mendelson (1986)) and price 
response to signed order flow with the fixed cost of trading based on continuous data on 
transaction and quotes (Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)). The most frequently used 
empirical liquidity measures require intraday data from the NYSE Trade and Quote 
(TAQ) database. Because my focus is on the long-run changes in information asymmetry, 
which requires analysis of the trends in liquidity over several years, I use Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) that is calculated using daily CRSP data. ILLIQ 
proxies Kyle’s lambda, which measures the price impact of trading volume using high 
frequency data. High adverse selection would result in greater price impact. The 
disadvantage of using ILLIQ is that it is less precise than microstructure measures. 
However, Hasbrouck (2010) finds that Amihud’s measure has high correlation with 
measures of liquidity calculated from high frequency data. For example, the correlation 
of ILLIQ with effective spread is 93.7%. Moreover, he finds that ILLIQ has the highest 
correlation with high frequency measures among all low frequency measures of liquidity. 
Another advantage of using a measure calculated from daily data is that TAQ data is not 
available for many small firms, which constitute a significant portion of the restatement 
sample (Badertscher and Burks (2010)). 
The Amihud (2002) price impact measure, ILLIQ, is defined as the absolute value 
of daily stock return, R, divided by the daily dollar trading volume, VOLD. It measures 
the trading volume needed to move the stock price. 
I calculate daily ILLIQ for restating firm i for each day d as follows: 
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610*||
id
id
id VOLD
R
ILLIQ =       (1) 
To minimize the influence of outliers on my results, I winsorize ILLIQ at 1% and 
99% levels. I consider NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks separately because trading 
costs of NASDAQ-listed stocks are higher than NYSE/AMEX-listed stocks and because 
volume has different meaning for NASDAQ stocks (Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), 
Bessembinder (1999) and (2003) and Reinganum(1990)). 
 
4. Data 
The restatement sample for the period January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2002 was 
initially obtained from GAO (2002). I restrict my sample to 1997-2002 period for several 
reasons. First, I analyze liquidity one year after a restatement and do not want post-
restatement period to coincide with financial crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 has been 
associated with large decreases in liquidity, especially around the collapse of Lehman. 
Therefore, I constrain my sample so that I do not incorrectly attribute decrease in 
liquidity to restatements that may actually be related to the financial crisis. Second, my 
sample ends before the passages of SOX and therefore all restatements in my sample 
were made in the same regulatory environment. The number of restatements increased 
substantially after the passage of SOX, largely because of the increase in the number of 
less egregious restatements. Therefore, by limiting the sample to the pre-SOX period, I 
focus on “a time when restatements were less frequent and firms faced less pressure to 
restate for errors of questionable materiality” (Burks (2009)). 
I collect additional information regarding each restatement from the Lexis-Nexis 
and Factiva databases. I exclude restatements that are caused by an adoption of new 
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accounting rules or by a change in method of accounting, and retain only restatements 
due to an error or improper interpretations of GAAP. I also delete restatements that affect 
only the timing of item recognition and had no impact on annual net income or when I 
could not determine the impact on the net income. I require that a restating firm has the 
necessary CRSP and Compustat data. My final dataset consists of 468 restatements made 
by 442 firms. Most firms (95%) restate financial statements only once during my sample 
period.8 
Table 1, Panel A shows the distribution of restatements by year and exchange. 
There has been an increase in the number of restatements between 1997 and 2000, with a 
decrease in 2001. Note that for 2002, I include restatements only through June 30, 2002 
so that they precede SOX enactment. On average, 63% of restatements are made by firms 
listed on NASDAQ and this average is fairly consistent for all years except 1999 and 
2002.  
Restatements that amend at least one 10-K (Annual) constitute the majority of my 
sample (see Table 1, Panel B). The vast majority of restating firms (83%) revise net 
income downward. I call such restatements income decreasing restatements. 
Restatements that revise net income upward are called income increasing restatements. I 
analyze income decreasing and income increasing restatements separately. While any 
restatement indicates poor quality of previously reported financial statements, an income 
decreasing restatement may have different implications for information asymmetry than 
an income increasing restatement. Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2009) find that 
relative to income decreasing restatements (upward earnings management misstatement 
                                                 
8
 My results are robust to limiting the sample to firms that made only one restatement during my sample 
period and to just analyzing the first restatement of all firms. 
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firms), income increasing restatements (downward earnings management misstatement 
firms) exhibit lower accruals, book-tax differences, interest coverage, external financing, 
changes in accounts receivable and inventory; higher level and change in cash flows from 
operations and higher size; and lower mean but higher median profitability.9 They 
conclude that “misstatement firms that manage earnings downward appear to differ in 
fundamental ways from misstatement firms that manage earnings upward, which suggests 
that researchers should distinguish between upward and downward earnings 
management,” (page 6). 
About thirty two percent of restatements are correcting revenue accounts, with 
NASDAQ firms correcting revenue accounts more often than NYSE/AMEX firms. 
Income increasing restatements correct revenue much less frequently (11.86% compared 
with 35.13%). Auditors originated 8.97% of income decreasing restatements and only 
3.39% of income increasing restatements. On the contrary, the SEC originates more 
income increasing than income decreasing restatements in percentage terms: 52.54% of 
income increasing and 14.10% of income decreasing restatements.  
Consistent with prior studies, I find negative abnormal return, CAR01, of -8.97% 
at restatement announcement. CAR01 is calculated as a market model cumulative 
abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to restatement. The market model is 
estimated over a 250 trading day period ending on day -46 relative to restatement using 
value-weighted CRSP index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ companies. CAR01 is 
more negative for both income decreasing and income increasing restatements and equals 
-9.39% and -6.79%, respectively. For income decreasing restatements, CAR01 is more 
                                                 
9
 Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2009) calculate these variables either for the year for which the 
firm restates its financial statements or the year before that (see Appendix A). 
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negative for firms listed on NASDAQ (-11.01%) than for firms listed on NYSE or 
AMEX (-6.88%). For income increasing restatements, the opposite is true: CAR01 is 
lower for NASDAQ firms and equals -6.40% compared with -7.93% for NYSE/AMEX 
firms. 
<<< Insert Table 1 here >>> 
I also report statistics for NI_impact, which measures the impact of restatement on 
net income. It is calculated as the difference between restated net income (summed over 
all periods) and originally reported net income (summed over all periods), divided by 
total assets one year prior to restatement announcement. The mean value of NI_impact 
equals -5.586 and the median equals -.038, suggesting substantial skewness. In absolute 
terms the magnitude of income decreasing restatements is much larger than the 
magnitude of income increasing restatements.  For my sample the mean error period is 
about two years. Restating firms in my sample are fairly large with market capitalization 
of $2,243 million and total assets of $2,271 million, with the mean leverage of 
approximately 19%. Restating firms have negative mean and median return on assets. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Trends in liquidity of restating firms 
To test my hypotheses, I plot monthly ILLIQ for three periods associated with the 
restatement timeline: pre-error, error and post-restatement. I first calculate monthly 
ILLIQ for each firm as an average of daily numbers and then find the average of monthly 
numbers for each month across all firms. The graph also shows announcement period 
illiquidity calculated as an average over days 0 and +1, where day 0 is the day of 
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restatement announcement. It is marked with a line labeled “Restatement”.  For pre-error 
and post-restatement periods I depict ILLIQ for one year. Although the error period is 
firm-specific, I show trends in ILLIQ six months after mistake and six months before 
restatement for all sub-samples. Note that all three periods in Figures 2.1-2.3 are non-
overlapping. If the error period of a firm is less than six months, the firm will have 
missing observations in respective parts of the error period.  
Figure 2.1 shows trends in illiquidity for the full sample, which includes income 
decreasing restatements, income increasing restatements and restatements with zero 
impact on net income. It illustrates that illiquidity starts increasing six months prior to 
restatement and continues increasing for one year after restatement announcement. This 
pattern is particularly pronounced for restating firms listed on NASDAQ. For this sub-
sample, there is a slight downward trend in illiquidity in pre-error period and the first six 
months of the error period. For NYSE/AMEX restating firms there is an increase in 
illiquidity several months before and four months after restatement. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
the illiquidity effects for income decreasing restatements. The graph is very similar to 
that for the full sample for firms listed on all exchanges, with the upward trend in 
illiquidity more pronounced after restatement announcement. Figure 2.3 shows that 
trends in illiquidity for income increasing restatements are different than for the full 
sample and for income decreasing restatements. Illiquidity exhibits much more volatility, 
which can potentially be attributed to smaller sample size. For NASDAQ firms, 
illiquidity increases one month before restatement, decreases at restatement 
announcement, and increases several months after restatement. For NYSE and AMEX 
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firms, illiquidity decreases in months -2 and -1 relative to restatement and increases in 
months +10, +11 and +12.  
<<< Insert Figure 2 here >>> 
Most studies on restatements analyze a fixed window around either a restatement 
or a mistake. However, the problem with such approach is that one mixes pre-error, error 
and post-restatement periods.10 For example, Desai, Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman 
(2006) examine short interest 24 months before and after restatement announcement. 
However, the average length of the error period for NASDAQ restatements is only 1.5 
years. Therefore, for many of these restatements 24 months window before restatement 
will include both the error and the pre-error period. To make my study comparable to 
prior literature, in Figure 3 I also show trends in illiquidity during longer fixed period 
prior to restatement: 18 months before restatement and 12 months after restatement. The 
results are very similar to those in Figure 2 but show less volatility in illiquidity prior to 
restatement announcement. Overall, trends in monthly ILLIQ provide preliminary support 
for hypotheses 1 and 2.  
<<< Insert Figure 3 here >>> 
Table 2 shows average ILLIQ for the following windows relative to restatement:  
months (-18; -7), months (-3, -1), month -1, restatement announcement (days 0, +1), and 
months (+1, +12). The results for the full sample and for income decreasing restatements 
listed on all exchanges are similar to those in Figures 2 and 3: illiquidity increases three 
months before restatement and one year after restatement relative to illiquidity in months            
(-18; -7). The increase is particularly significant one year after restatement relative to 
                                                 
10
 Note that my analysis in Figure 2 does not suffer from this problem and shows non-overlapping pre-
error, error and post-restatement periods. 
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illiquidity before restatement (months (-18; -7)). It equals 97% for NASDAQ, 129% for 
NASDAQ income decreasing, 58% for NYSE/AMEX and 80% for NYSE/AMEX 
income decreasing restatements. For income increasing NASDAQ restatements 
illiquidity decreases during months (-3; -1) and at restatement announcement, and 
increases only 7% one month before restatement and one year after restatement. For 
income increasing NYSE/AMEX restatements illiquidity decreases in all periods relative 
to months (-18; -7). 
<<< Insert Table 2 here >>> 
To test whether trends in illiquidity shown in Figures 2.1-2.3, Figures 3.1-3.3 and 
Table 2 are statistically significant, I run a Fama McBeth (1973) type regression (Tables 
3-5). First, for each firm I regress the log of ILLIQ on time dummies for the periods of 
interest. Then I average coefficients for all restatement specific regressions and use a t-
test to examine their significance. The advantage of this approach is that it controls for 
cross-sectional correlation in residuals so that no single restatement drives the results. 
This approach does not suffer from the biases introduced by other approaches such as 
pooled OLS regression, in which firms with longer timelines can skew the results. A 
similar cross-sectional application of Fama McBeth (1973) regression is used by Coval 
and Shumway (2009) and Badertscher and Burks (2010). 
Tables 3-5 present estimates for each restatement using daily data for one year 
before the error through one year after restatement. Separate analysis is performed for 
NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX firms. Table 3 shows the results for the full sample of 
restatements. I find that for NASDAQ restatements illiquidity increases starting in month 
-3 relative to restatement (Table 3). The increase persists one year after restatement 
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announcement. NYSE/AMEX restatements show a decrease in illiquidity in month -3 and 
an increase in illiquidity in months +3 to +12 relative to restatement. This result suggests 
that information asymmetry increases for one year after restatement announcement. It 
complements findings of Wilson (2008), who shows that informational content of 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs) decreases only temporarily for two to three 
quarters after restatement announcement. The difference in the results can be attributed to 
Wilson analyzing firms that have sufficient analyst coverage data. Such firms are larger 
than those analyzed in my study and tend to have lower information asymmetry (Bowen, 
Chen and Cheng (2008)). Moreover, Wilson (2008) analyzes changes in ERC subsequent 
to restatement relative to ERC estimated five quarters before restatement announcement. 
However, as shown by Bardos, Golec and Harding (2010a), ERCs prior to restatement 
announcement are a function of mistake and therefore are not a reliable benchmark. 
Another possibility for the difference in results is that earnings response coefficients are 
calculated using potentially biased analyst forecasts, while my measure of information 
asymmetry is calculated using market data.  
<<< Insert Table 3 here >>> 
Tables 4 and 5 show separate analysis for income decreasing and income 
increasing restatements, respectively. Results for income decreasing restatements are 
very similar to those for the full sample. For NASDAQ income decreasing restatements 
illiquidity increases four months before restatement through one year after the 
restatement (Table 4). NYSE/AMEX income decreasing restatements exhibit decrease in 
illiquidity six months before restatement announcement. However, only coefficient on 
month -3 dummy is statistically significant at 10% level. For these firms illiquidity 
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increases starting one month after restatement announcement. This increase persists for 
the entire year following a restatement.  For income increasing restatements none of the 
changes in illiquidity around restatement are statistically significant (Table 5).11  
<<< Insert Tables 5 and 6 here >>> 
Overall the results indicate that illiquidity increases prior to restatement and 
remains at elevated levels for many months after restatement announcement for income 
decreasing NASDAQ restatements, supporting hypotheses 1 and 2. For NYSE/AMEX 
firms illiquidity increases for eleven months starting one month after restatement 
announcement, supporting hypothesis 2. These results suggest that poor quality of 
financial information substantially increases information asymmetry among different 
groups of investors. 
 
5.2. Cross-sectional analysis of changes in illiquidity of restating firms 
In this section I examine cross-sectional variation in the changes of illiquidity 
around restatement announcement. Although any restatement may reveal lower quality of 
financial information, there are heterogeneous reasons for restatements and their impact 
on financial statements varies, potentially leading to heterogeneous implications for 
liquidity. I regress changes in illiquidity before restatement, at restatement announcement 
and after restatement on restatement characteristics and control variables.  
First, I test whether changes in illiquidity are different for income decreasing and 
income increasing restatements by estimating the following model:  
                                                 
11
 In results not shown I also separately analyze annual and quarterly restatements. Annual restatements are 
those that amend at least one 10-K. Quarterly restatements amend only 10-Qs (Quarterly). I find that the 
results for annual and quarterly restatements are very similar.  
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Model 1: iii1p  Periodi εΩControlsdecreasing Income∆ILLIQ +++= βα   (2) 
In this model Income decreasing is a dummy variable that equals one for income 
decreasing restatements and zero for income increasing restatements. Univariate and 
graph analysis indicates that income decreasing and income increasing restatements have 
different trends in illiquidity, with income decreasing restatements experiencing greater 
increase in illiquidity. Therefore, I expect positive coefficient on Income decreasing 
dummy.  
Model 2 includes several restatement characteristics.12  
Model 2: i4i3i2i1
p  Period
i AnnualAuditorSECRevenue∆ILLIQ ββββα ++++=  
ii εΩControls ++          (3) 
I include an indicator variable Revenue, which equals one if restatement corrects 
revenue account. Prior literature suggests that market participants focus primarily on the 
revenue component of earnings (Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen (2003)). Revenue 
recognition restatements are associated with higher shareholder losses at restatement 
announcement (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)) and longer loss of the 
information content of earnings (Wilson (2008)). Therefore, revenue recognition 
restatements can result in greater increase in information asymmetry. I also include two 
indicator variables for the party originating the restatement: SEC and Auditor, which 
equal one if the SEC or auditor originated the restatement, respectively. I use GAO 
(2002) dataset to identify prompter of the restatement.  I expect that the effect on the 
illiquidity is more severe when an external party rather than the management itself 
                                                 
12
 This model excludes Income decreasing dummy because it can potentially be correlated with other 
restatement characteristics, such as Revenue and Auditor. 
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uncovers problems with financial statements. Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) 
find that market reaction to restatements is more severe for restatements originated by 
auditors. Lastly, I include a dummy variable Annual, which equals one if a restatement 
amended at least one 10-K. Since 10-Ks are externally audited, their restatement might be 
viewed as more serious and cause greater increases in information asymmetry. Moreover, 
the error period for annual restatements is longer than that for quarterly. I expect an 
annual restatement to result in greater increase in illiquidity. 
I also estimate model with both Income decreasing dummy and restatement 
characteristics. A potential issue with this model is that some of restatement 
characteristics can be collinear with  Income decreasing dummy. 
Model 3: i4i3i2i1
p  Period
i AnnualAuditorSECRevenue∆ILLIQ ββββα ++++=  
iii1 εΩControlsdecreasing Income +++ β       (4) 
I include the following control variables in all models: logarithm of price (Price), 
volatility of returns (Std_return) and market capitalization (MarketCap), since these 
variables have been shown to determine liquidity (Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009)). 
For each variable I calculate time series averages for the period of interest. Table 6 
presents descriptive statistics for these variables. In Panel A these variables are calculated 
as time series averages for the window of (-3; +1) months relative to restatement. In 
Panel B these variables are calculated as time series averages for a one year window after 
restatement announcement. Log(Price) and Log(MarketCap) decrease after restatement 
for both NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX firms. 
Table 7 estimates all three models for illiquidity three months before restatement. 
Specifically, the dependent variable is restbeforemILLIQ __3 , which equals the difference of 
 24 
the log of ILLIQ estimated three months before restatement and the log of ILLIQ 
estimated during the baseline period. The baseline period is a one year period prior to 
restatement ending six months before restatement announcement. Price, Std_return and 
MarketCap are estimated as time series averages for months -3 through month -1 relative 
to a restatement.  
<<< Insert Table 7, Panel A here >>> 
Consistent with univariate analysis, for NASDAQ restating firms I find that the 
coefficient on Income decreasing is positive and significant at 5% in Models 1 and 3, 
suggesting that income decreasing restatements result in greater illiquidity (Table 7). 
Auditor dummy is negative and marginally significant (at 6% level), suggesting that 
illiquidity increases less prior to restatement when it is originated by auditor. Revenue, 
SEC and Annual dummies are not significant at explaining cross-sectional variation in 
illiquidity three months before restatement for NASDAQ restatements. I find a smaller 
increase in illiquidity for firms with higher stock prices, while larger firms experience 
greater increase in illiquidity. 
Table 7, Panel B shows the analysis of changes in illiquidity three months before 
restatement for NYSE/AMEX restatements. I find that there is little cross-sectional 
variation in illiquidity three months before restatement for NYSE/AMEX restatements. 
All restatement characteristics are insignificant in all models. The level of stock price is 
the only significant variable in all models. Coefficient on standard deviation of returns is 
positive and significant in Model 1.  
<<< Insert Table 7, Panel B here >>> 
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I also examine cross-sectional determinants of changes in restatement 
announcement illiquidity relative to the baseline period, but find that none of restatement 
characteristics are significant (results not tabulated), suggesting no cross-sectional 
variation in announcement period illiquidity. 
In Table 8 I report the analysis of cross-sectional variation in changes in 
illiquidity one year after restatement. The dependent variable is restafteryILLIQ __1 , which 
equals the difference of the log of ILLIQ estimated one year after restatement and the log 
of ILLIQ estimated during the baseline period. Panel A analyzes the sample of NASDAQ 
restatements. The coefficient on Income decreasing dummy is positive and significant at 
7% level in Model 1. However, the coefficient on Income decreasing becomes 
insignificant in Model 3 potentially due to multicollinearity issues. I find that the 
coefficient on Revenue is positive and significant at 1% level in models 2 and 3, 
suggesting that revenue recognition restatements experience larger increase in illiquidity 
after restatement announcement. Coefficient on Auditor is negative and significant at 7% 
level in models 2 and 3. Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater 
increase in illiquidity as suggested by positive and significant coefficients on 
log(MarketCap) and log(Std_return). The coefficient on log(Price) is negative, indicating 
that stocks with higher price experience smaller increase in illiquidity. 
<<< Insert Table 8, Panel A here >>> 
Table 8, Panel B shows the analysis for NYSE/AMEX firms. I continue to find 
that revenue restatements increase illiquidity more. However, for NYSE/AMEX firms 
restatements initiated by auditor do not result in lesser increase in illiquidity as suggested 
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by insignificant coefficient on Auditor dummy. All control variables are significant and 
have expected signs. 
<<< Insert Table 8, Panel B here >>> 
In alternative specifications instead of using Income decreasing dummy, I include 
NI_impact, which measures the impact of restatement on net income.13 A restatement that 
has a greater impact on net income indicates poorer quality of previously reported 
financial statements, therefore potentially leading to greater increase in illiquidity. The 
estimated coefficient on this variable is not significant and the rest of the results are not 
affected. This suggests that it is the direction of the restatement and not the magnitude of 
its impact on net income that affects illiquidity before restatement.  
Other characteristics of a restatement can capture its severity, some of which 
could be difficult to quantify. I account for such characteristics by including a two-day 
(0,+1) restatement announcement abnormal return, CAR01. CAR01 should be more 
negative for more serious restatements. Therefore, there should be a negative association 
between CAR01 and illiquidity. Since revenue recognition restatements have lower 
CAR01, I exclude Revenue dummy in specifications with CAR01 to avoid 
multicollinearity. The coefficient on CAR01 is not significant and the rest of the results 
are not affected.  
Furthermore, I perform separate analysis for income decreasing and income 
increasing subsamples. For income decreasing restatements results are the same as for the 
full sample. For income increasing restatements, I find that the auditor dummy is no 
longer significant, while all control variables become significant in the analysis.  
 
                                                 
13
 Results are not tabulated. 
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Overall, cross-sectional analysis suggests that three months before restatement 
illiquidity is higher for income decreasing NASDAQ restatements and that there is no 
cross-sectional variation for NYSE/AMEX restatements. Restatements initiated by 
auditor experience less significant increase in illiquidity up to three months before 
restatement and one year after restatement for NASDAQ firms. Restatements correcting 
revenue increase illiquidity more during a one year period following a restatement for 
firms listed on all exchanges. Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater 
increase in illiquidity while stocks with higher price experience smaller increase.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies long-term changes in Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity 
around restatement announcements. I separately analyze restatements that result in 
downward and upward revision of net income (income decreasing and income increasing 
restatements, respectively). I also analyze NASDAQ firms separately because they have 
higher trading costs than stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX. 
I find that illiquidity increases several months prior to income decreasing 
restatements. This result is consistent with findings of Bardos, Golec and Harding 
(2010a), who show that investors detect poor earnings quality several months before 
restatement announcement. Income decreasing restatements experience increase in 
illiquidity at restatement announcement that persists for at least one year after 
restatement.  
Cross-sectional analysis of the changes in illiquidity for NASDAQ restatements 
reveals that restatements originated by auditor result in lower changes in illiquidity both 
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before and after a restatement. Restatements that affect revenue recognition increase 
illiquidity more following restatement announcement for firms listed on all exchanges. 
Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater increase in illiquidity while 
stocks with higher price experience smaller increase in illiquidity.  
Overall my results indicate that restatements result in long-term increase in 
information assymetry.  My findings support SEC regulators’ and market analysts’ 
contention that restatements cause damage to long-term credibility of financial 
statements.   
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Figure 2. Monthly mean ILLIQ in pre-error, error and post restatement periods 
Figures 2.1-2.3 show monthly mean ILLIQ for the full sample, income decreasing and income increasing 
restatements, respectively. ILLIQ is Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, calculated as the absolute value 
of daily stock return divided by the daily dollar trading volume. Income decreasing (income increasing) 
restatements are defined as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. Solid 
line labeled “Mistake” indicates the beginning of the error period. The error period is defined as the period, 
which extends from the first misstated period to the day of restatement announcement. Solid line labeled 
“Restatement” corresponds to the day of and the day after restatement announcement (days 0 and +1). All 
other points show ILLIQ estimated over a one month period. I assume that there are 21 trading days in one 
month.  
 
Figure 2.1. Monthly mean ILLIQ for the full sample 
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Figure 2.2. Monthly mean ILLIQ for income decreasing restatements 
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Figure 2.3. Monthly mean ILLIQ for income increasing restatements 
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Figure 3. Monthly mean ILLIQ 18 months before and 12 months after restatement 
Figures 3.1-3.3 show monthly mean ILLIQ for the full sample, income decreasing and income increasing 
restatements, respectively. ILLIQ is Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, calculated as the absolute value 
of daily stock return divided by the daily dollar trading volume. Income decreasing (income increasing) 
restatements are defined as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. Solid 
line labeled “Restatement” corresponds to the day of and the day after restatement announcement (days 0 
and +1). All other points show ILLIQ estimated over a one month period. I assume that there are 21 trading 
days in one month.  
 
Figure 3.1. Monthly mean ILLIQ for the full sample 
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Figure 3.2. Monthly mean ILLIQ for income decreasing restatements 
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Figure 3.3. Monthly mean ILLIQ for income increasing restatements 
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Table 1. Sample description  
This table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of restating firms made between January 1, 1997 and 
June 30, 2002. Annual restatements include a restatement of at least one annual (audited) report. Quarterly 
restatements are defined as restatements of quarterly financial statements only and no restatement of an 
annual (audited) report. Income decreasing (income increasing) restatements are defined as restatements 
that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. Revenue is a dummy variable that equals one if 
revenue account was restated. Auditor and SEC are dummy variables that equal one if restatements were 
initiated by auditor or SEC, respectively. CAR01 is a market model cumulative abnormal return for days 
zero and plus one relative to a restatement announcement. Market model parameters are estimated over a 
250 day period starting on day -46 relative to restatement using value weighted market index. NI_impact is 
the difference between restated net income (summed over all periods) and originally reported net income 
(summed over all periods), divided by total assets one year prior to restatement announcement. Lengths of 
the error period is the number of years spanned by the error period. Error period extends from the first 
misstated period to the date of restatement announcement. MarketCap is the market value of equity 
calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. Total Assets is the total assets as 
reported on the balance sheet. Leverage is the value of long term debt divided by total assets. ROA is the 
return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. MarketCap, Total Assets, Leverage and 
ROA are reported at year end prior to announcement.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of restatements by year and exchange 
* For 2002 restatements were collected only through June 30, 2002 so that all restatements in the sample 
precede Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
Year All Exchanges NASDAQ NASDAQ as a % NYSE/AMEX NYSE/AMEX as a % 
1997 58 38 65.5% 20 34.5% 
1998 61 41 67.2% 20 32.8% 
1999 105 61 58.1% 44 41.9% 
2000 105 73 69.5% 32 30.5% 
2001 73 48 65.8% 25 34.2% 
2002* 66 32 48.5% 34 51.5% 
Total 468 293 62.6% 175 37.4% 
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Table 1 (continued). Sample description 
 
Panel B: Types of restatements  
  Full Sample As a %  NASDAQ As a %  
NYSE/ 
AMEX As a%  
Annual  300 64.10% 187 63.82% 113 64.57% 
Quarterly 168 35.90% 106 36.18% 62 35.43% 
       
Income decreasing 390 83.30% 239 81.57% 151 86.29% 
Income increasing 59 12.60% 43 14.68% 16 9.14% 
Zero impact on NI 19 4.10% 11 3.75% 8 4.57% 
       
Income decreasing annual 247 52.80% 150 51.19% 97 55.43% 
Income decreasing quarterly 143 30.60% 89 30.38% 54 30.86% 
Income increasing annual 39 8.30% 28 9.56% 11 6.29% 
Income increasing quarterly 20 4.30% 15 5.12% 5 2.86% 
       
Revenue       
Full sample 150 32.05% 100 34.13% 50 28.57% 
Income decreasing 137 35.13% 92 38.49% 45 29.80% 
Income increasing 7 11.86% 4 9.30% 3 18.75% 
       
Auditor       
Full sample 38 8.12% 24 8.19% 14 8.00% 
Income decreasing 35 8.97% 21 8.79% 14 9.27% 
Income increasing 2 3.39% 2 4.65% 0 0.00% 
       
SEC       
Full sample 91 19.44% 50 17.06% 41 23.43% 
Income decreasing 55 14.10% 25 10.46% 30 19.87% 
Income increasing 31 52.54% 22 51.16% 9 56.25% 
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Table 1 (continued). Sample description 
 
Panel C: Restatement and firm characteristics     
 All Exchanges NASDAQ firms NYSE/AMEX firms 
  Mean Median Std  N Mean Median Std  N Mean Median Std  N 
CAR01                         
Full sample -8.97% -4.05% 17.55% 446 -10.17% -5.69% 18.93% 279 -6.96% -2.42% 14.81% 167 
Income 
decreasing -9.39% -4.13% 18.28% 370 -11.01% -6.12% 19.91% 225 -6.88% -2.42% 15.13% 145 
Income 
increasing -6.79% -3.62% 13.83% 58 -6.40% -4.23% 14.20% 43 -7.93% -3.57% 13.10% 15 
NI_impact 
Full sample -5.586 -0.038 78.795 448 -4.167 -0.055 65.278 282 -7.997 -0.025 97.741 166 
Income 
decreasing -6.790 -0.060 86.560 371 -5.210 -0.100 72.430 229 -9.350 -0.040 105.670 142 
Income 
increasing 0.315 0.059 0.695 58 0.429 0.164 0.790 42 0.017 0.008 0.031 16 
Lengths of the error period (in years) 
Full sample 1.91 1.62 1.22 468 1.73 1.53 1.01 293 2.20 1.93 1.47 175 
Income 
decreasing 1.89 1.61 1.22 390 1.71 1.41 1.01 239 2.19 1.92 1.45 151 
Income 
increasing 1.97 1.84 1.24 59 1.81 1.81 0.92 43 2.42 2.16 1.81 16 
MarketCap (in millions) 
Full sample 2,243 180 9,370 444 1,041 91 7,338 280 4,295 621 11,820 164 
Income 
decreasing 2,325 160 10,029 368 1,060 85 7,982 227 4,362 599 12,411 141 
Income 
increasing 2,083 287 5,692 58 901 177 3,617 42 5,185 1,974 8,555 16 
Total assets (in millions) 
Full sample 2,271  222  8,578  448 772  95  5,742  282 4,817  1,243  11,525  166 
Income 
decreasing 2,287  222  8,851  371 884  91  6,364  229 4,549  1,154  11,478  142 
Income 
increasing 2,591  210  8,088  58 273  123  547  42 8,675  4,079  13,902  16 
Leverage 
Full sample 0.1857 0.1427 0.2013 446 0.1438 0.0547 0.1969 281 0.2571 0.2290 0.1888 165 
Income 
decreasing 0.1883 0.1463 0.1893 370 0.1461 0.0664 0.1793 229 0.2568 0.2473 0.1857 141 
Income 
increasing 0.1943 0.0913 0.2830 57 0.1429 0.0161 0.2905 41 0.3258 0.2564 0.2198 16 
ROA 
Full sample -0.1560 -0.0056 0.4858 448 -0.2192 -0.0376 0.5837 282 -0.0485 0.0115 0.2020 166 
Income 
decreasing -0.1685 -0.0094 0.5223 371 -0.2395 -0.0429 0.6336 229 -0.0540 0.0105 0.2129 142 
Income 
increasing -0.1001 -0.0007 0.2383 58 -0.1329 -0.0319 0.2686 42 -0.0141 0.0140 0.0883 16 
 
 40 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of illiquidity around restatements  
This table shows descriptive statistics for ILLIQ for selected windows around restatement. ILLIQ is 
Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of daily stock return, divided 
by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). Income decreasing (income increasing) restatements 
are defined as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income.  
 
  
Mean Median Std  N 
Full sample (NASDAQ) 
Months (-18; -7) relative to restatement 1.094 0.150 2.158 288 
Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 1.392 0.181 2.854 293 
Month -1 relative to restatement 1.619 0.163 3.519 293 
Restatement announcement (days 0, +1) 1.275 0.105 3.798 275 
Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 2.162 0.625 3.692 280 
 
    
Full sample (NYSE/AMEX) 
Months (-18; -7) relative to restatement 0.625 0.011 1.989 173 
Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 0.893 0.011 3.163 170 
Month -1 relative to restatement 0.935 0.011 3.412 169 
Restatement announcement (days 0, +1) 0.917 0.008 4.161 167 
Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 0.988 0.022 3.146 171 
 
    
Income decreasing restatements (NASDAQ) 
Months (-18; -7) relative to restatement 1.001 0.163 1.918 234 
Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 1.394 0.209 2.740 239 
Month -1 relative to restatement 1.596 0.207 3.362 239 
Restatement announcement (days 0, +1) 1.434 0.121 4.153 222 
Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 2.297 0.698 3.847 226 
 
    
Income decreasing restatements (NYSE/AMEX) 
Months (-18; -7) relative to restatement 0.587 0.011 1.879 150 
Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 0.911 0.012 3.197 148 
Month -1 relative to restatement 0.920 0.012 3.278 147 
Restatement announcement (days 0, +1) 0.831 0.008 3.638 145 
Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 1.054 0.024 3.314 149 
 
    
Income increasing restatements (NASDAQ) 
Months (-18; -7) relative to restatement 1.281 0.066 2.453 43 
Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 0.992 0.06 2.317 43 
Month -1 relative to restatement 1.369 0.052 3.756 43 
Restatement announcement (days 0, +1) 0.651 0.068 1.583 42 
Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 1.365 0.121 2.063 43 
 
    
Income increasing restatements (NYSE/AMEX) 
Months (-18; -7) relative to restatement 0.441 0.002 1.54 15 
Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 0.178 0.001 0.427 15 
Month -1 relative to restatement 0.166 0.001 0.436 15 
Restatement announcement (days 0, +1) 0.048 0.001 0.096 15 
Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 0.293 0.003 0.801 15 
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Table 3. Illiquidity around restatements (full sample) 
This table presents mean coefficients across firm specific time series regressions of daily log(ILLIQ) on 
time dummies. ILLIQ is Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of 
daily stock return, divided by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). The model is estimated for 
each restatement using daily data for one year before mistake through one year after restatement. I include 
time dummies for each month 6 months before restatement and 12 months after restatement. I assume that 
there are 21 trading days in one month. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
  
NASDAQ restatements NYSE/AMEX restatements 
 Time dummies Mean t-value Pr>|t| N Mean t-value Pr>|t| N 
Intercept      -2.627 -19.25*** <0.01 294 -4.434 -21.26*** <0.01 174 
Month BEFORE restatement           
-6 0.087 1.12 0.26 290 -0.063 -0.79 0.43 170 
-5 0.082 1.01 0.31 291 -0.054 -0.66 0.51 170 
-4 0.118 1.45 0.15 292 -0.131 -1.59 0.11 170 
-3 0.156 1.90* 0.06 293 -0.146 -1.68* 0.09 170 
-2 0.195 2.17** 0.03 293 -0.136 -1.52 0.13 170 
-1 0.358 3.82*** <0.01 293 -0.014 -0.15 0.88 169 
           
Restatement announcement 
(days 0, +1) 0.371 3.31*** <0.01 270 -0.110 -0.99 0.33 164 
           
Month AFTER restatement           
+1 0.585 5.54*** <0.01 268 0.042 0.41 0.69 168 
+2 0.788 7.12*** <0.01 266 0.175 1.61 0.11 165 
+3 0.831 7.50*** <0.01 257 0.233 1.88* 0.06 163 
+4 0.817 7.11*** <0.01 255 0.216 1.69* 0.09 157 
+5 0.787 6.57*** <0.01 247 0.170 1.32 0.19 152 
+6 0.798 6.29*** <0.01 241 0.308 2.40** 0.02 151 
+7 0.863 6.59*** <0.01 238 0.350 2.55*** 0.01 150 
+8 0.886 6.54*** <0.01 232 0.328 2.38** 0.02 147 
+9 0.862 6.23*** <0.01 228 0.399 2.81*** 0.01 146 
+10 0.894 6.47*** <0.01 223 0.322 2.31** 0.02 145 
+11 0.814 5.66*** <0.01 217 0.304 2.12* 0.04 145 
+12 0.927 6.35*** <0.01 210 0.265 1.71* 0.09 144 
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Table 4. Illiquidity around income decreasing restatements 
This table presents mean coefficients across firm specific time series regressions of daily log(ILLIQ) on 
time dummies. ILLIQ is Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of 
daily stock return, divided by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). The model is estimated for 
each restatement using daily data for one year before mistake through one year after restatement. I include 
time dummies for each month 6 months before restatement and 12 months after restatement. I assume that 
there are 21 trading days in one month. Income decreasing (income increasing) restatements are defined as 
restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. *, **, and *** indicates significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
  
NASDAQ restatements NYSE/AMEX restatements 
 Time dummies Mean t-value Pr>|t| N Mean t-value Pr>|t| N 
Intercept      -2.548 -17.46*** <0.01 240 -4.416 -19.72*** <0.01 150 
Month BEFORE restatement           
-6 0.118 1.42 0.16 236 -0.075 -0.91 0.36 148 
-5 0.081 0.92 0.36 237 -0.040 -0.48 0.63 148 
-4 0.152 1.78* 0.08 238 -0.123 -1.46 0.15 148 
-3 0.227 2.61*** 0.01 239 -0.149 -1.71* 0.09 148 
-2 0.290 3.06*** <0.01 239 -0.134 -1.44 0.15 148 
-1 0.471 4.88*** <0.01 239 -0.003 -0.03 0.98 147 
           
Restatement announcement 
(days 0, +1) 0.499 4.18*** <0.01 218 -0.098 -0.86 0.39 142 
           
Month AFTER restatement           
+1 0.712 6.33*** <0.01 214 0.049 0.46 0.65 146 
+2 0.960 8.18*** <0.01 212 0.192 1.69* 0.09 143 
+3 1.011 8.51*** <0.01 204 0.244 1.93* 0.06 141 
+4 0.986 8.08*** <0.01 202 0.242 1.82* 0.07 137 
+5 0.968 7.45*** <0.01 196 0.196 1.43 0.16 132 
+6 0.984 6.97*** <0.01 190 0.332 2.42** 0.02 131 
+7 1.040 7.07*** <0.01 188 0.351 2.38** 0.02 130 
+8 1.112 7.52*** <0.01 184 0.334 2.23** 0.03 127 
+9 1.086 7.33*** <0.01 182 0.416 2.68*** 0.01 126 
+10 1.144 7.64*** <0.01 180 0.320 2.19** 0.03 125 
+11 1.034 6.55*** <0.01 175 0.323 2.13** 0.03 125 
+12 1.173 7.19*** <0.01 169 0.297 1.82* 0.07 124 
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Table 5. Illiquidity around income increasing restatements  
This table presents mean coefficients across firm specific time series regressions of daily log(ILLIQ) on 
time dummies. ILLIQ is Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of 
daily stock return, divided by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). The model is estimated for 
each restatement using daily data for one year before mistake through one year after restatement. I include 
time dummies for each month 6 months before restatement and 12 months after restatement. I assume that 
there are 21 trading days in one month. Income decreasing (income increasing) restatements are defined as 
restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. *, **, and *** indicates significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 NASDAQ restatements NYSE/AMEX restatements 
 Time dummies Mean t-value Pr>|t| N Mean t-value Pr>|t| N 
Intercept   -3.022 -7.74*** <0.01 43 -5.114 -7.30*** <0.01 16 
Month BEFORE restatement           
-6 -0.019 -0.08 0.94 43 0.067 0.20 0.84 15 
-5 0.099 0.40 0.69 43 -0.139 -0.37 0.72 15 
-4 0.015 0.06 0.96 43 -0.053 -0.17 0.87 15 
-3 -0.133 -0.51 0.61 43 -0.027 -0.07 0.95 15 
-2 -0.299 -1.06 0.30 43 -0.144 -0.39 0.71 15 
-1 -0.231 -0.76 0.45 43 0.011 0.03 0.98 15 
           
Restatement announcement 
(days 0, +1) -0.267 -0.83 0.41 42 -0.128 -0.29 0.78 15 
           
Month AFTER restatement           
+1 0.018 0.06 0.95 43 0.090 0.21 0.84 15 
+2 0.084 0.27 0.79 43 0.117 0.26 0.80 15 
+3 0.275 0.89 0.38 43 0.263 0.46 0.65 15 
+4 0.400 1.21 0.23 43 -0.026 -0.05 0.96 13 
+5 0.142 0.43 0.67 42 -0.084 -0.19 0.85 13 
+6 0.152 0.48 0.63 42 -0.070 -0.17 0.87 13 
+7 0.205 0.66 0.51 42 0.124 0.30 0.77 13 
+8 0.001 0.00 1.00 40 0.096 0.21 0.84 13 
+9 -0.010 -0.03 0.98 38 0.178 0.38 0.71 13 
+10 -0.101 -0.28 0.78 35 0.368 0.60 0.56 13 
+11 -0.061 -0.16 0.87 34 0.181 0.29 0.78 13 
+12 -0.056 -0.16 0.87 33 0.039 0.06 0.96 13 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for control variables for cross-sectional analysis 
This table shows descriptive statistics for control variables used in cross-sectional analysis of changes in 
illiquidity. Log(Price) is the natural logarithm of daily stock price averaged over the period of interest. 
Log(Std_return) is the natural logarithm of volatility of daily stock returns averaged over the period of 
interest. Log(MarketCap) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization averaged over the period of 
interest. Variables in Panel A are averaged over months (-3; -1) relative to restatement. Variables in Panel 
B are averaged over months (+1; +12) relative to a restatement. I assume that there are 21 trading days in 
one month.  
 
 
Panel A:  Months (-3, -1) relative to restatement 
 Mean Median Std  N 
NASDAQ     
Log (Price) 1.88 1.94 1.09 286 
Log (Std_return)  -2.96 -2.94 0.51 293 
Log (MarketCap)  11.41 11.38 1.68 286 
 
    
NYSE/ AMEX     
Log (Price)  2.63 2.84 1.18 168 
Log (Std_return)  -3.41 -3.44 0.54 170 
Log (MarketCap) 13.36 13.42 2.21 168 
     
Panel B:  Months (+1, +12) relative to restatement 
 Mean Median Std  N 
NASDAQ     
Log (Price) 1.36 1.40 1.31 277 
Log (Std_return)  -2.75 -2.76 0.58 279 
Log (MarketCap)  10.93 10.75 1.83 277 
     
NYSE/ AMEX     
Log (Price) 2.29 2.51 1.34 170 
Log (Std_return)  -3.22 -3.29 0.66 170 
Log (MarketCap)  13.04 13.01 2.31 170 
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Table 7. Cross-sectional determinants of changes in illiquidity before restatement 
announcement 
This table shows cross sectional analysis of restbeforemILLIQ __3 , which equals the difference of the log of 
ILLIQ estimated for months -3 through -1 before restatement and the log of ILLIQ estimated during the baseline 
period. The baseline period is a one year period prior to restatement ending six months before restatement 
announcement. ILLIQ is Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of daily 
stock return, divided by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). See Tables 1 and 6 for definition of 
explanatory variables. Price, Std_return and MarketCap are estimated during months (-3, -1) relative to 
restatement. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: NASDAQ restatements 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coefficient t-value Pr<|t|   Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
  
Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
Intercept -1.444 -1.65* 0.10  -1.046 -1.22 0.22 
 
-1.449 -1.65* 0.10 
Income decreasing 0.371 1.96** 0.05     
 
0.407 1.96** 0.05 
Revenue     0.108 0.73 0.47 
 
0.062 0.42 0.68 
SEC     -0.062 -0.32 0.75 
 
0.080 0.39 0.70 
Auditor     -0.471 -1.88* 0.06 
 
-0.470 -1.88* 0.06 
Annual     0.142 0.98 0.33 
 
0.139 0.96 0.34 
Log (Price)  -0.956 -8.71*** <0.01  -0.963 -8.68*** <0.01 
 
-0.960 -8.70*** <0.01 
Log (Std_return)  0.123 0.80 0.43  0.152 0.97 0.33 
 
0.148 0.95 0.34 
Log (MarketCap)  0.294 4.32*** <0.01  0.288 4.20*** <0.01 
 
0.291 4.27*** <0.01 
        
    
N 271    271   
 
271 
  
Adjusted R-square 32.26%    31.71%   
 
32.44% 
  
F 33.14    18.91   
 
17.21 
  
Pr>F <0.01       <0.01     
  
<0.01 
    
 
Panel B: NYSE/AMEX restatements 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coefficient t-value Pr<|t|   Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
  
Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
Intercept 0.975 1.41 0.16  0.971 1.44 0.15 
 
0.956 1.34 0.18 
Income decreasing -0.026 -0.13 0.89     
 
0.012 0.06 0.95 
Revenue     0.074 0.57 0.57 
 
0.074 0.57 0.57 
SEC     0.127 0.88 0.38 
 
0.130 0.87 0.39 
Auditor     0.003 0.02 0.99 
 
0.003 0.01 0.99 
Annual     -0.081 -0.66 0.51 
 
-0.081 -0.66 0.51 
Log (Price)  -0.339 -3.43*** <0.01  -0.344 -3.36*** <0.01 
 
-0.345 -3.35*** <0.01 
Log (Std_return)  0.220 1.68* 0.09  0.200 1.49 0.14 
 
0.200 1.48 0.14 
Log (MarketCap)  0.051 1.09 0.28  0.045 0.92 0.36 
 
0.045 0.92 0.36 
     
    
   
N 161    161 
   
161   
Adjusted R-square 22.24%    21.44% 
   
20.93%   
F 12.44    7.24 
   
6.29   
Pr>F <0.01       <0.01 
      
<0.01     
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Table 8. Cross-sectional determinants of changes in illiquidity after restatement 
announcement 
This table shows cross sectional analysis restafteryILLIQ __1 , which equals the difference of the log of ILLIQ 
estimated one year after restatement and the log of ILLIQ estimated during the baseline period. The baseline 
period is a one year period prior to restatement ending six months before restatement announcement. ILLIQ is 
Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of daily stock return, divided by the 
daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). See Tables 1 and 6 for definition of explanatory variables. Price, 
Std_return and MarketCap are estimated during months (+1, +12) relative to restatement. *, **, and *** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: NASDAQ restatements 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coefficient t-value Pr<|t|   Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
  
Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
Intercept -0.604 -0.63 0.53  -0.263 -0.28 0.78 
 
-0.553 -0.58 0.56 
Income decreasing 0.412 1.81* 0.07     
 
0.324 1.32 0.19 
Revenue     0.496 2.79*** 0.01 
 
0.452 2.50*** 0.01 
SEC     -0.014 -0.06 0.95 
 
0.087 0.37 0.71 
Auditor     -0.537 -1.82* 0.07 
 
-0.537 -1.83* 0.07 
Annual     -0.030 -0.18 0.86 
 
-0.035 -0.20 0.84 
Log (Price)  -1.090 -8.99*** <0.01  -1.102 -9.16*** <0.01 
 
-1.092 -9.08*** <0.01 
Log (Std_return)  0.453 2.57*** 0.01  0.417 2.35** 0.02 
 
0.429 2.42** 0.02 
Log (MarketCap)  0.362 4.75*** <0.01  0.346 4.56*** <0.01 
 
0.35 4.61*** <0.01 
        
 
   
N 260    260 
 
 
 
260   
Adjusted R-square 45.44%    46.53% 
 
 
 
46.69%   
F 54.92    33.20 
 
 
 
29.35   
Pr>F <0.01       <0.01 
  
  
  
<0.01     
 
Panel B: NYSE/AMEX restatements 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coefficient t-value Pr<|t|   Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
  
Coefficient t-value Pr<|t| 
Intercept 1.593 1.77* 0.08  1.478 1.76* 0.08 
 
1.388 1.53 0.13 
Income decreasing 0.144 0.52 0.61     
 
0.077 0.27 0.79 
Revenue     0.356 1.99** 0.05 
 
0.354 1.97** 0.05 
SEC     -0.167 -0.81 0.42 
 
-0.154 -0.73 0.47 
Auditor     -0.121 -0.40 0.69 
 
-0.125 -0.41 0.68 
Annual     -0.214 -1.25 0.21 
 
-0.215 -1.25 0.21 
Log (Price)  -0.607 -4.68*** <0.01  -0.634 -4.90*** <0.01 
 
-0.636 -4.89*** <0.01 
Log (Std_return)  0.607 3.47*** 0.00  0.581 3.33*** <0.01 
 
0.579 3.31*** <0.01 
Log (MarketCap)  0.160 2.61*** 0.01  0.184 2.92*** <0.01 
 
0.185 2.93*** <0.01 
     
    
   
N 162    162 
   
162   
Adjusted R-square 43.07%    44.40% 
   
44.06%   
F 31.55    19.36 
   
16.85   
Pr>F <0.01       <0.01 
      
<0.01     
 
